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TRUTHFUL TESTIMONY AS THE “QUINTESSENTIAL 
EXAMPLE OF SPEECH AS A CITIZEN”: WHY LANE V. FRANKS 
LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR PROTECTING PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEE TRUTHFUL TESTIMONY 
Lemay Diaz* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, a divided United States Supreme Court decided Garcetti 
v. Ceballos, declaring that “when public employees make statements 
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as 
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not 
insulate their communications from employer discipline.”1  The 
decision considerably narrowed the scope of public employees’ First 
Amendment protections by making all speech made pursuant to 
official job duties government speech, and thus not entitled to 
protection.  This sparked substantial debate and confusion given that 
the Court did not provide much guidance as to when a public 
employee acts pursuant to official duties.2  In particular, lower courts 
disagreed over whether the majority’s categorical “never” should apply 
when the speech in question is in the context of truthful testimony.3  
The decision is troublesome because every year, thousands of police 
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 1  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).  
 2  See id. at 424.  
 3  Compare Chrzanowski v. Bianchi, 725 F.3d 734, 741 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 2870 (2014) (citing Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 524–25 (7th Cir. 
2009)), Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2007), and Reilly v. Atlantic City, 
532 F.3d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 2008), with Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., 523 F. App’x 709, 
712 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. Lane 
v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2375 (2014), Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 708 
(9th Cir. 2009), overruled in part by Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 
2013) (en banc) (overruling Huppert “to the extent that it improperly relied on a 
generic job description and failed to conduct the ‘practical,’ fact-specific inquiry 
required by Garcetti”), and Green v. Barrett, 226 F. App’x 883, 887 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(per curiam). 
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officers, detectives, and investigators, among other law enforcement 
officers, take the stand and testify as part of their job duties.4 
In a recent case, Lane v. Franks, the Court addressed the issue and 
held that the First Amendment protects a public employee who 
provides sworn testimony, compelled by subpoena, outside the course 
of his ordinary job duties.5  In doing so, the Court provided some 
guidance as to when Garcetti’s “pursuant to official duties” standard 
should apply.  The Court, however, left open the question of whether 
that protection applies to public employees, such as police officers or 
crime scene investigators, who often provide sworn testimony as part 
of their ordinary duties.6 
This Comment argues that even though the Court did not reach 
this question, Lane lays the foundation for finding that public 
employees’ sworn testimony pursuant to ordinary job duties is 
protected citizen speech.  First, Lane refines and narrows Garcetti’s 
“pursuant to official duties” standard, thereby limiting the ability of 
lower courts to read Garcetti too broadly.  Second, key language in 
Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion provides the impetus for finding 
that sworn testimony must always be considered citizen speech.  
Specifically, this Comment will argue that the Garcetti rationales do not 
apply when the speech in question is sworn testimony because: 1) every 
citizen has a right and duty to testify in court, and the application of 
Garcetti in this context infringes on liberties that the public employee 
would otherwise enjoy as a citizen; 2) not protecting that right will 
undoubtedly undermine the societal value of testimony by causing 
public employees to self-censor; and 3) protecting public employee 
sworn testimony will not commit the courts to a new intrusive role, 
since courts already hold the sole authority over witnesses and their 
testimony. 
Part II will provide a brief overview of the history of First 
Amendment protections for public employees.  Special attention will 
be given to the two primary Supreme Court cases on the subject, as 
 
 4  See, e.g., Police and Detectives: What Police and Detectives Do—Occupational Outlook 
Handbook, 201415 Edition, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Jan. 8, 2014), 
http://www.bls.gov/ooh/protective-service/police-and-detectives.htm#tab-2 (noting 
that uniformed police officers, detectives, and investigators typically testify in court as 
part of their duties).  In 2014, federal, state, and local agencies employed over 844,000 
detectives, investigators, and police officers.  See Household Data Annual Averages: 11b. 
Employed Persons by Detailed Occupation and Age, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (2014), 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11b.pdf (indicating that in 2014, these agencies 
employed 164,000 detectives and criminal investigators, and 680,000 police and 
sheriff’s patrol officers).  
 5  Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2378 (2014).  
 6  Id. at 2378 n.4, 2384 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
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well as the circuit split that occurred following the Garcetti decision.  
Part III will discuss the importance of truthful testimony to the judicial 
system by exploring the common law duty and right of all citizens to 
testify, and the protections afforded to witnesses.  Part IV will analyze 
the recent Supreme Court decision in Lane v. Franks.  Finally, Part V 
will argue why the Lane decision laid the groundwork for protecting 
public employees’ sworn testimony, since it limited the scope of Garcetti 
and highlighted truthful testimony as inheritably citizen speech.  As 
such, truthful testimony must always be considered citizen speech 
because the rationales behind Garcetti fail in this circumstance.  Part VI 
will conclude. 
II. THE ROAD TO LANE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FIRST 
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS 
It is a bedrock principle of American jurisprudence that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”7  
The Supreme Court has long emphasized the importance of allowing 
a free exchange in the marketplace of ideas to our democratic 
government.8  As Justice Brandeis once opined, the Founding Fathers 
knew that: 
[O]rder cannot be secured merely through fear of 
punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to 
discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds 
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces 
stable government; that the path of safety lies in the 
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and 
proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil 
counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as 
applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence 
coerced by law—the argument of force in its worst form.9 
 
 7  U.S. CONST. amend. I.   
 8  See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972) (“To 
permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment 
for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free 
from government censorship.”); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) 
(“[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of 
self-government.”); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (stating 
that there is a “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include 
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and 
public officials”); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market . . . . That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.”).  
 9  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
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Early on, however, the Court carved out an exception to this 
principle in situations in which the government acted as an employer 
based largely on Justice Holmes’ rationale that government 
employment is a privilege, not a right.10  Under this view, when the 
government acts as an employer, it is free to dictate the terms of 
employment and can discharge an employee at will, even if it infringed 
on otherwise constitutionally protected rights.11  After all, the 
government employer has a substantial interest in maintaining 
workplace efficiency.12  Thus, the Court relied on this unchallenged 
dogma for much of the twentieth century, denying public employees 
their First Amendment rights when they accepted employment with 
the government.13 
A. The Rise of Public Employee First Amendment Protection: the 
Pickering-Connick Test 
Beginning in the early 1950s, however, the Court began to chip 
away at Holmes’ theory.14  Although still recognizing the government 
 
 10  McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892) (“[A policeman] may have 
a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a 
policeman.”).   
 11  See, e.g., Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952); McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 
517; see also Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Comment, Freedom of Speech in the Public Workplace: A 
Comment on the Public Concern Requirement, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1109, 1112–13 (1988).   
 12  See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150–51 (1983) (quoting Ex parte Curtis, 106 
U.S. 371, 373 (1882)) (“One hundred years ago, the Court noted the government’s 
legitimate purpose in ‘[promoting] efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official 
duties, and [in] [maintaining] proper discipline in the public service.’”).  
 13  See id. at 143–44 (collecting cases); see, e.g., Adler, 342 U.S. at 492 (upholding a 
New York statute that allowed for the termination of public teachers who were 
members of the Communist Party); Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 720–21 
(1951) (upholding a City of Los Angeles ordinance requiring public employees to take 
oaths that they had not been members of organizations like the Communist Party as a 
“reasonable regulation to protect the municipal service”); United Pub. Workers v. 
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 103 (1947) (upholding provision of Hatch Act that prohibited 
federal public employees from taking active part in political management or political 
campaigns); Ex Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. at 375 (upholding federal statute prohibiting 
public employees from contributing, requesting, or receiving donations for political 
purposes). 
 14  See Lee, supra note 11, at 1112–15.  See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 
589, 597–610 (1967) (invalidating two statutes prohibiting hiring or retaining 
employees of educational institutions who belong to identified “subversive” 
organizations or who make “treasonable or seditious” statements); Cafeteria Workers 
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 900 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
government could not deny employment because of a person’s political affiliation); 
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960) (invalidating a requirement that public 
school teachers periodically disclose the organizations to which they have belonged or 
have made a contribution); Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952) (holding 
that a state could not require its employees to establish their loyalty by extracting an 
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employer’s interest in workplace efficiency, by the time the Court 
decided Keyishian v. Board of Regents, “the theory that public 
employment . . . may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how 
unreasonable, ha[d] been uniformly rejected.”15  Thus, during its 1968 
term, the Court dealt the final blow to the view that government 
employers had unfettered authority to disregard public employees’ 
constitutional rights in the landmark case Pickering v. Board of 
Education.16  In doing so, the Court announced a balancing test where 
courts must balance the “interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the 
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services 
it performs through its employees.”17 
Marvin Pickering, a schoolteacher in Will County, Illinois, wrote 
and published a letter to the local newspaper criticizing the Board of 
Education and the superintendent for the way they mishandled 
proposals to raise funds for the schools.18  Subsequently, the Board 
fired Pickering claiming that the letter was “detrimental to the efficient 
operation and administration of the schools of the district.”19  
Pickering sued, alleging that the First Amendment and the Fourteenth 
Amendment protected the speech within his letter, but the Illinois 
Supreme Court rejected the claim.20 
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, 
stating that a public employee does not relinquish his or her First 
Amendment rights as a citizen to comment on matters of public 
concern by merely holding government employment.21  First, the Court 
determined that Pickering’s letter constituted speech on a matter of 
public concern, given that “free and open debate is vital to informed 
decision-making by the electorate,” and that Pickering, as a teacher, 
was one of the members of the community “most likely to have 
informed and definite opinions” on how to best operate the schools.22  
The Court determined that this interest was so important under the 
First Amendment that “it [was] necessary to regard [Pickering,] the 
teacher[,] as the member of the general public he seeks to be.”23 
 
oath denying past affiliation with Communists).   
 15  Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605–06 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 16  Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 17  Id. at 568.  
 18  Id. at 564. 
 19  Id. at 564 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 20  Id. at 567–68. 
 21  Id. at 574–75. 
 22  Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571–72.   
 23  Id. at 574.  
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At the same time, the Court recognized the Board’s prerogative 
to regulate an employee’s speech in the interest of its efficient and 
proper functions.24  The Court determined, however, that under the 
facts at bar, the Board’s interest in limiting Pickering’s speech was “not 
significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution 
by any member of the general public.”25  Particularly, while Pickering’s 
statements were critical of the Board, they did not impede his daily 
functions as a teacher or interfere with the school’s operation.26  
Additionally, the Court recognized that the threat of dismissal from 
public employment served as a potent means of inhibiting speech.27  
Thus, absent proof of false statements, it was Pickering’s right as a 
citizen to speak on matters “of public importance,” and this right 
trumped the school’s interest of functioning efficiently.28 
Fifteen years later, in Connick v. Myers, the Court clarified Pickering 
by holding that the “public concern” element is a threshold inquiry.29  
Sheila Myers, an assistant district attorney, circulated an intra-office 
questionnaire after her supervisor told her that she was being 
transferred to a different department.30  Mayer’s supervisor 
subsequently terminated her.31  The Court found Myer’s speech 
unprotected because all but one of the questions related to internal 
workplace grievances, which are not a matter of public concern.32  The 
Court noted that Pickering had not held that all statements by public 
employees were entitled to balancing, but that rather, as a threshold 
matter, the employee has to show that the speech regarded a matter of 
public concern.33  In particular, the Court made clear that when an 
employee’s speech cannot be fairly characterized as constituting 
speech on a matter of public concern, there is no balancing and the 
government employer has wide latitude to make management 
decisions free from “intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of 
the First Amendment.”34 
 
 24  Id. at 568. 
 25  Id. at 573.  
 26  Id. at 572–73. 
 27  Id. at 574. 
 28  Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574.   
 29  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).  
 30  Id. at 140–41. 
 31  Id. at 141.  
 32  Id. at 148–49.  To determine whether speech concerns a matter of public 
concern, Connick directs courts to examine the “content, form, and context of a given 
statement, as revealed by the whole record.”  Id. at 147–48. 
 33  Id. at 146. 
 34  Id.  
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In short, Pickering and Connick acknowledged a public employee’s 
right to speak only on matters of public concern, but the Court was 
careful to require that this right must be balanced against the 
government employer’s interest in administrative efficiency. 
B. Garcetti v. Ceballos and “The Pursuant to Official Duties” Standard 
For the next two decades, the Court and lower courts applied the 
Pickering-Connick test, first determining whether the speech qualified as 
a matter of public concern, and if so, then balancing it against the 
government employer’s interest in administrative efficiency.35  Then, 
in 2006, the Court narrowed Pickering significantly by adding a new 
threshold test to determine whether the employee’s speech qualified 
for First Amendment protection.36 
Robert Ceballos, a calendar deputy district attorney, wrote an 
internal memorandum advising his supervisor that the affidavit used 
to obtain a search warrant contained “serious misrepresentations[,]” 
and recommending dismissal of that case.37  Garcetti, Ceballos’s 
supervisor, decided to pursue the case despite Ceballos’s findings.38  In 
the aftermath, Garcetti allegedly subjected Ceballos to numerous 
retaliatory actions, and Ceballos sued, claiming violation of his First 
Amendment right.39 
In ruling in favor of Garcetti, a 5-to-4 Supreme Court found that 
the controlling factor in the case was that Ceballos spoke as an 
employee, not as a citizen, when he wrote the memorandum because 
he wrote it “pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy.”40  In so doing, 
the Court held that “when public employees make statements pursuant 
to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for 
 
 35  See, e.g., City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84–85 (2004) (holding that no 
Pickering balancing was needed and that the First Amendment did not protect a police 
officer fired for selling pornography on eBay depicting him masturbating after 
undressing from a fake police uniform, because plaintiff did not show his speech was 
on a matter of public concern); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987) (“The 
threshold question in applying this balancing test is whether McPherson’s speech may 
be ‘fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern.’”) 
(quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146); see also Mullin v. Town of Fairhaven, 284 F.3d 31, 
37 (1st Cir. 2002) (treating the public concern prong as a threshold question to the 
Pickering balancing test); Clue v. Johnson, 179 F.3d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1999); Vojvodich v. 
Lopez, 48 F.3d 879, 884–85 (5th Cir. 1995); Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1562 
(10th Cir. 1989).  
 36  See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
 37  Id. at 414.  
 38  Id. at 414–15. 
 39  Id. at 415. 
 40  Id. at 421.  
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First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate 
their communications from employer discipline.”41  Therefore, the 
Court did not need to reach the question of whether the 
memorandum involved a matter of public concern.  Thus, in order for 
a court to even consider whether the public employee’s speech is 
protected under the Pickering-Connick test, the employee must meet a 
threshold question by showing that he spoke as a citizen and not 
pursuant to official duties.  The Court effectively added another step 
to the inquiry—one that significantly limits potential First Amendment 
protection. 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, relied on three main 
lines of reasoning to support the holding.  First, restrictions on speech 
made pursuant to official duties “do[] not infringe any liberties the 
employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen” and only reflect an 
employer’s exercise of control over what the employer paid the 
employee to do or create.42  For example, the President’s press 
secretary is paid to articulate and disseminate the President’s views, not 
to offer his own opinions on the topics of the day. 
Second, refusing to recognize First Amendment protection to a 
public employee’s work product—speech made pursuant to official 
duties—in no way undermines “the potential societal value of 
employee speech,” since public employees “retain the prospect of 
constitutional protection for their contributions to the civic 
discourse.”43  Thus, while Ceballos’s work product, the memorandum, 
was subject to government supervision, he could still join a political 
party and voice his opinion about any issue just like a regular citizen. 
Finally, the majority reasoned that a contrary approach to speech 
made pursuant to official duties would commit the courts “to a new, 
permanent, and intrusive role, mandating judicial oversight of 
communications between and among government employees and 
their superiors in the course of official business.”44  Such displacement 
of public employers’ managerial discretion, the Court stated, found no 
support in its precedent and would violate “sound principles of 
federalism and the separation of powers.”45 
Garcetti significantly diminished the scope of a public employee’s 
First Amendment rights.  From then on, public employees seeking First 
Amendment protection would need to first show that they spoke in 
 
 41  Id. at 421.  
 42  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).   
 43  Id. at 422. 
 44  Id. at 423.  
 45  Id.  
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their role as citizens, not as a public employee.  Then, the employees 
would need to show that their speech was a matter of public concern.  
Only after providing sufficient evidence to satisfy these two threshold 
questions would the Pickering balancing test kick in. 
C. Post-Garcetti Discord and Confusion 
Although the Garcetti decision made clear that by writing the 
memorandum, Ceballos spoke pursuant to his official duties, the Court 
did not address the issue of whether Ceballos’s truthful testimony 
qualified as protected speech.  In his dissenting opinion, Justice Souter 
specifically cautioned that “the claim relating to truthful testimony in 
court must surely be analyzed independently to protect the integrity of 
the judicial process.”46  This very issue went on to cause much 
confusion among the lower courts, leading to a circuit split. 
1. Sworn Testimony as Protected Citizen Speech 
Some circuit courts opined that truthful testimony falls outside 
the scope of the Garcetti test since every citizen is obligated to testify 
truthfully at judicial proceedings.47  Consequently, when a public 
employee testifies, he “is not simply performing his . . . job duties; 
rather, the employee is acting as a citizen and is bound by the dictates 
of the court. “48 
For example, in 2011, Kirk Chrzanowski served as an assistant 
state’s attorney in the McHenry County State Attorney’s Office when a 
special prosecutor began investigating suspected wrongdoing by 
Chrzanowski’s supervisor, Louis Bianchi.49  Pursuant to a subpoena, 
Chrzanowski testified before a grand jury regarding allegations that 
Bianchi improperly influenced the handling of a case involving his 
relatives and political allies.50  Chrzanowski also testified at Bianchi’s 
trial, again pursuant to a subpoena.51  During this period, Bianchi 
began placing negative comments on Chrzanowski’s file, which had 
 
 46  Id. at 444 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 47  See, e.g., Chrzanowski v. Bianchi, 725 F.3d 734, 741 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 2870 (2014) (citing Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 524–25 (7th Cir. 
2009)); Reilly v. Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that a police 
officer’s trial testimony was protected by the First Amendment because the officer had 
an “independent obligation as a citizen to testify truthfully”); Morales v. Jones, 494 
F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2007) (concluding that a public employee’s subpoenaed 
deposition testimony about speech he made pursuant to his official duties was 
protected by the First Amendment). 
 48  Reilly, 532 F.3d at 231 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 49  Chrzanowski, 725 F.3d at 736.  
 50  Id.  
 51  Id. at 736–37.  
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little relation to his job performance.52  A few months after the trial, 
Bianchi fired Chrzanowski.53 
In finding that Chrzanowski’s sworn testimony was protected 
speech, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that pursuant to Garcetti, the 
question of whether the public employee speaks as a citizen or 
employee requires a practical inquiry.54  The court found that giving 
truthful testimony pursuant to a subpoena was not part of 
Chrzanowski’s daily job duties, and thus, he had spoken as a citizen 
when he testified.55 
The Seventh Circuit further reasoned that even if Chrzanowski 
had testified pursuant to his official job duties, he had nonetheless 
spoken as a citizen.  Particularly, the court emphasized that when a 
public employee gives testimony pursuant to a subpoena, he is 
fulfilling the general duty of every citizen “to appear before a grand 
jury or at trial,” and thus, “he speaks as a citizen for First Amendment 
purposes[,]” not as an employee.56  As a result, the Seventh Circuit held 
that Garcetti could not apply in this context.  First, the rationale that 
restrictions on public employees’ speech “do not infringe on any 
liberties” enjoyed as private citizens is inapposite, since anyone 
compelled to testify has a strong interest in telling the truth—under 
the law, failure to testify truthfully can result in sanctions, including 
incarceration.57  Second, given “the longstanding principle that the 
public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence,” restrictions on 
compelled testimony undermine the societal value and interest in 
hearing such speech.58  Finally, protecting sworn testimony would not 
commit the courts to an “intrusive role” in the communications 
between Chrzanowski and Bianchi, since the employer had no 
legitimate managerial interest in dissuading the testimony.59  
Therefore, the court held that the Garcetti rationales are inapplicable 
in the context of compelled sworn testimony, and thus a public 
employee who gives compelled testimony always speaks as a citizen.60 
Similarly, in Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, the Third Circuit went 
much further.61  Robert Reilly, a police officer in the vice and 
 
 52  Id. at 737. 
 53  Id. 
 54  Id. at 738.  
 55  Chrzanowski, 725 F.3d at 740. 
 56  Id. at 741 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).   
 57  Id.  
 58  Id. at 742 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).   
 59  Id.  
 60  Id. 
 61  Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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intelligence units for the Atlantic City Police Department, obtained 
information about possible corruption in the department while 
working as an investigator.62  During the subsequent trial, which 
involved his supervisor, the prosecution called Reilly as a witness and 
he testified.63  In the aftermath, Reilly’s supervisors charged him with 
several disciplinary violations, including making disparaging 
comments to a colleague.64  An independent hearing officer 
recommended suspending Reilly for four days, but his two supervisors 
demoted him instead.65  Reilly filed suit, alleging violation of his First 
Amendment rights.66 
The Third Circuit relied on the settled principle that the “duty to 
testify has long been recognized as a basic obligation that every citizen 
owes his government,” and held that a public employee’s trial 
testimony is citizen speech.67  The court reasoned that even though “an 
employee’s official responsibilities provided the initial impetus to 
appear in court[,] [it] is immaterial to his/her independent obligation 
as a citizen to testify truthfully.”68  The court concluded that a public 
employee’s trial testimony is citizen speech because his duty to testify 
as a citizen outweighs his employee duties.69  Finally, the Third Circuit 
distinguished the Garcetti decision because the Court had only dealt 
with the issue of whether Ceballo’s memorandum was protected 
speech, remanding the issue of whether Ceballo’s testimony was 
protected speech.70  In short, even if an employee’s official 
responsibilities compel him to appear in court, testimony under oath 
is the sort of conduct performed by citizens and protected by the First 
Amendment.  As such, truthful testimony is always citizen speech, even 
if the person goes to court under the guise of official job duties. 
2. All Speech Made Pursuant to Official Duties, Including 
Sworn Testimony, is Unprotected 
Other circuits, however, interpreted Garcetti to mean that all 
speech made pursuant to a public employee’s official duties, including 
sworn testimony, is speech that belongs to the government employer, 
 
 62  Id. at 220. 
 63  Id.  
 64  Id. at 221.  
 65  Id. at 221–22. 
 66  Id. at 222. 
 67  Reilly, 532 F.3d at 231 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 
(1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 68  Id.  
 69  Id. 
 70  Id. 
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and thus, not protected despite its context.71 
In Green v. Barret, the Eleventh Circuit followed this strict 
construction of Garcetti.72  Shirlie D. Green, the Chief Jailer at the 
Fulton County jail, testified under subpoena at an emergency hearing 
in Fulton County Superior Court.73  Jacquelyn Barrett, the County 
Sheriff, had requested the hearing to assess whether the jail was a safe 
place to keep a convicted murderer, who had attempted to escape a 
week earlier.74  Green testified that the cell doors had problems and 
were not secure, and the next day Barret fired her.75  Green filed suit 
claiming Barret had violated her First Amendment rights, and Barret 
moved for summary judgment claiming qualified immunity.76 
In finding for Barret, the Eleventh Circuit held that it did not 
need to reach the qualified immunity issue since Green’s testimony was 
unprotected under Garcetti.77  The court explained that Garcetti created 
a distinction between speech as a citizen and speech pursuant to 
official job duties, and “[t]his distinction [was] not affected by the fact 
that the plaintiff made the statements in testimony.”78  Because Green’s 
testimony arose from her position as Chief Jailer, she spoke pursuant 
to her official duties, and therefore, her speech was unprotected. 
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Huppert v. City 
of Pittsburg.79  Ron Huppert began working as a patrol officer for 
Pittsburg Police Department (“PPD”) in 1991, and later became an 
inspector after a promotion.80  While working for the PPD, the Contra 
Costa County District Attorney’s Office called Huppert to assist in the 
investigation of corruption at the Pittsburg Public Works Yard.81  A year 
later, Huppert scored highly in the sergeant’s exam, but his supervisors 
denied him the promotion.82  In 2001, Huppert assisted the Federal 
 
 71  See, e.g., Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., 523 F. App’x 709, 712 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(per curiam), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 
2369, 2375 (2014); Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 708 (9th Cir. 2009), 
overruled in part by Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); 
Green v. Barrett, 226 F. App’x 883, 887 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 
 72  Green, 226 F. App’x at 886.  
 73  Id. at 884.  
 74  Id. 
 75  Id. 
 76  Id. at 884–85.   
 77  Id. at 886. 
 78  Green, 226 F. App’x at 886.  
 79  Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 708 (9th Cir. 2009), overruled in part 
by Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
 80  Id. at 698. 
 81  Id. 
 82  Id. at 699.  
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Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) in a case regarding alleged corruption 
within the police department, and his supervisors subsequently 
transferred him to an undesired building in the PPD.83  By 2004, 
Huppert was a gang investigator when the court subpoenaed him to 
testify before a civil grand jury in charge of investigating corruption 
within the PPD.84  Shortly thereafter, Wayne Derby, Huppert’s 
supervisor, eliminated Huppert’s position and transferred him to a 
position investigating fraud and forgeries, increasing his workload 
while maintaining the same pay.85  Huppert claimed that his new 
supervisor, William Addington, subjected him to constant harassment, 
and after Addington “attempted to replace Huppert’s ‘superlative’ 
yearly evaluation” with an evaluation Addington had prepared, 
Huppert filed a grievance against the PPD, and then retired in late 
2004.86 
In finding Huppert’s sworn testimony unprotected, the Ninth 
Circuit relied on California precedent predating Garcetti for the 
proposition that a police officer’s official duties included testifying in 
court.87  The court reasoned that because Huppert was a police officer, 
he testified pursuant to his official job duties and, under Garcetti, he 
had spoken as a public employee, not as a citizen.88  The court declined 
to follow decisions like Reilly, claiming that its rationale impermissibly 
chipped away at the clear distinction created by Garcetti.89  Moreover, 
the court found that other avenues, such as whistle-blower statutes, 
were available to people who faced reprisal from reporting 
government corruption.90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 83  Id. 
 84  Id. at 700.  
 85  Huppert, 574 F.3d at 700.  
 86  Id.  
 87  Id. at 707. 
 88  Id. at 708. 
 89  Id. 
 90  Id. at 709–08. 
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III. THE IMPORTANCE OF TRUTHFUL TESTIMONY TO THE JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM 
It is axiomatic that truthful testimony is a bedrock principle of the 
proper function of the American judicial system.91  Among the primary 
missions of our judicial system is to ensure justice under the law, which 
is only possible by searching for and discovering the truth.92  Truthful 
testimony “constitutes one of the Government’s primary sources of 
information,”93 and our judicial system would not function without it.94 
A. The Right to Every Man’s Evidence: The Development of the Duty to 
Testify 
1. Witness Testimony at Common Law 
The common law duty to testify truthfully has long been 
established in Anglo-American jurisprudence.95  The modern use of 
witness testimony before a jury became prevalent in England as early 
as 1500, and by 1562, statutes established the power of courts to compel 
persons to testify.96  By early 1600, Lord Bacon observed that all subjects 
 
 91  See, e.g., United States v. Thoms, 684 F.3d 893, 903 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The 
longstanding and repeated invocations in caselaw of the need of district courts to hear 
live testimony so as to further the accuracy and integrity of the factfinding process are 
not mere platitudes.  Rather, live testimony is the bedrock of the search for truth in 
our judicial system.”).   
 92  Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th Cir. 
1989) (quoting Reeves v. Claiborne County Bd. of Educ., 828 F.2d 1096, 1100 (5th Cir. 
1987)) (“Our judicial system is designed to resolve disputes, to right wrongs.  We 
encourage uninhibited testimony, under penalty of perjury, in an attempt to arrive at 
the truth.”).  
 93  Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 93–94 (1964) (White, J., 
concurring).  
 94  Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 372 (1911) (quoting Amey v. Long [1808] 
103 Eng. Rep. 653, 657 (K. B.)) (“[T]estimony seems essential to the very existence 
and constitution of a Court of common law, which receives and acts upon both 
descriptions of evidence, and could not possibly proceed with due effect without 
them.”).   
 95  See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 439 n.15 (1956) (“But it is every 
man’s duty to give testimony before a duly constituted tribunal unless he invokes some 
valid legal exemption in withholding it.”); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 
(1919) (noting that “it is clearly recognized that the giving of testimony and the 
attendance upon court or grand jury in order to testify are public duties which every 
person within the jurisdiction of the Government is bound to perform upon being 
properly summoned”).  See generally 4 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192, at 648–52 (Little Brown and Co. 1923), 
http://galenet.galegroup.com.ezproxy.shu.edu/servlet/MOML?af=RN&ae=F375321
6404&srchtp=a&ste=14 (discussing the general duty to testify that every citizen owes to 
society).  
 96  See Statute of Elizabeth, 5 Eliz., c. 9, § 12 (1562); 4 WIGMORE, supra note 95 § 
2190, at 644. 
DIAZ (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2016  5:44 PM 
2016] COMMENT 579 
owed the King their “knowledge and discovery,”97 and by 1742, 
common law courts considered the general principle that “the public 
has a right to every man’s evidence” an “indubitable certainty” that 
“[could not] be denied.”98 Concurrently, common law courts used 
judicial oaths as a way of reminding witnesses that they had a duty to 
tell the truth.99  By early 1800, it was well-established that oaths were “a 
method of reminding the witness strongly of the Divine punishment 
somewhere in store for false swearing, and thus of putting him in a 
frame of mind calculated to speak only the truth as he saw it.”100 
Additionally, truthful and complete testimony was so important at 
common law that witnesses enjoyed absolute immunity from civil 
damage liability for their testimony in court.101  This immunity 
extended even to false testimony.102  The courts granted immunity to 
avoid witness self-censorship.  Specifically, the prospect of liability 
could make a witness reluctant to come forward to testify at all and 
even if the witness came forward, the threat of liability could lead to 
the witness distorting his testimony.103 
2. Recognition and Adoption of the Duty to Testify in 
American Jurisprudence 
The English common law was “assumed by the courts of justice, 
or declared by statute” as the law of every original colonial state.104  
Thus, it is to no surprise that the Framers and the First Congress 
recognized the duty to testify and the power of the courts to compel 
 
 97  Blair, 250 U.S. at 280 (quoting Countess of Shrewsbury’s Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 
769, 778 (1612)). 
 98  Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 n.5 (1972) (quoting 12 T.C. 
HANSARD, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 675, 693 (1812)).  
 99  See Eugene R. Milhizer, So Help Me Allah: An Historical and Prudential Analysis of 
Oaths as Applied to the Current Controversy of the Bible and Quran in Oath Practices in America, 
70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 19–37 (2009) (providing a concise history of the use of judicial oaths 
in the Anglo-American judicial system).   
 100  3 WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 
1816, at 857–58 (Little Brown and Co. 1923).  
 101  See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330–31 (1983) (collecting cases); Dawkins 
v. Lord Rokeby [1866] 176 Eng. Rep. 800, 812 (C. P.); Henderson v. Broomhead 
[1859] 157 Eng. Rep. 964, 968 (Exch.); Anfield v. Feverhill [1614] 80 Eng. Rep. 1113 
(K. B.); Cutler v. Dixon [1585] 76 Eng. Rep. 886 (Q. B.). 
 102  See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 331–32.   
 103  Id. at 333 (citing Henderson, 157 Eng. Rep. at 968; Barnes v. McCrate, 32 Me. 
442, 446 (1851)).  
 104  1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 473 (12th ed., O.W. Holmes, Jr. 
ed., 1873).  See also 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 157, at 104–
05 (3rd ed. Little Brown 1858) (stating that the English common law is our “birthright 
and inheritance,” and that the “whole structure of our present jurisprudence stands 
upon the original foundations of the common law”). 
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testimony by adopting the Sixth Amendment,105 and later through the 
Judiciary Act of 1789.106  Likewise, the early American judicial system 
borrowed and adopted judicial oaths from common law,107 and by 
1900, most states had adopted legislation regarding the oath 
requirement.108 
Today, the notion that all citizens owe an independent societal 
duty to aid law enforcement, including testifying in court proceedings, 
is well grounded in Supreme Court precedent.109  As Justice Gray 
announced in 1895, “[i]t is the duty and the right . . . of every citizen, 
to assist in prosecuting, and in securing the punishment of, any breach 
of the peace of the United States.”110  By adopting the common law 
principle that the public has a right to “every man’s evidence,” the 
Court infused every citizen with the civic duty and the right to testify.111 
Truthful testimony is so important to our judicial system that 
courts can compel citizens to come forward and speak even when they 
may not necessarily want to—thus transforming the civic duty to testify 
into a legal one.112  This is contrary to the general principle that the 
 
 105  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . .”).  
 106  Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, ch. 20, § 30 (“And any person may be compelled 
to appear and depose as aforesaid in the same manner as to appear and testify in 
court.”); id. § 33 (stating that “the recognizances of the witnesses for their appearance 
to testify in the case; which recognizances the magistrate before whom the 
examination shall be, may require on pain of imprisonment”).  
 107  See Milhizer, supra note 99, at 28.  As Milhizer points out, the Framers “held 
[oaths] in such high regard . . . that a bill regarding oaths of office was the first 
legislation passed by the inaugural Congress and signed by President Washington.”  Id. 
at 30–31.  Additionally, the Constitution incorporates oath requirements, though not 
in the testimonial context, in four places: U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; art. II, § 1, cl. 8; 
art. VI, cl. 3; and amend. IV.  
 108  3 WIGMORE, supra note 100, § 1828, at 877.  
 109  See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 175 n.24 (1977) (“The 
conviction that private citizens have a duty to provide assistance to law enforcement 
officials when it is required is by no means foreign to our traditions . . . .”); Ullmann 
v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 439 n.15 (1956); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 
281 (1919).  
 110  In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 535 (1895).  
 111  See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (citing United States v. Bryan, 
339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932)); see also 
Blair, 250 U.S. at 281. 
 112  See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688; see also Gravel v. United States, 408 US 606, 615 
(1972) (“The [C]onstitution gives to every man, charged with an offence, the benefit 
of compulsory process, to secure the attendance of his witnesses.”).  There are a few 
exceptions, not applicable in this context, which the courts have narrowly construed.  
See, e.g., id. at 615–16 (holding that the Speech or Debate Clause exempts members of 
Congress and their aids from being questioned about their speeches or debates made 
in Congress); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (stating that the Fifth 
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government cannot force a person to speak.  A citizen who is 
subpoenaed has the legal obligation, “which every person within the 
jurisdiction of the Government is bound to perform,” to come before 
the court as a witness.113  And in the role of a witness, a citizen is not 
entitled to object and cannot interfere with the court’s authority “or to 
set limits to the investigation that the grand jury may conduct.”114 
Additionally, regardless of whether a person is subpoenaed or 
voluntarily complies with the citizen’s duty to testify, he is bound by 
the legal duty to testify truthfully.  In serving as a witness, a citizen has 
the solemn and fundamental duty to tell the truth.115  Truthful 
testimony is “so necessary to the administration of justice” that the 
witness’s personal interest in privacy must yield to the public’s 
overriding interest in full disclosure.116  Additionally, no one, not even 
the government, can tell a witness what to say in court, or prevent a 
witness from testifying against them.117  Instead, the witness must tell 
the truth as he knows it. 
Moreover, Congress has provided the courts with broad powers to 
enforce and control the “the performance of this duty.”118  For 
instance, the court may punish a witness by “fine or imprisonment, or 
both, at its discretion” for failure to comply with a subpoena.119  
Similarly, Federal Rule of Evidence 603 codifies the requirement that 
every witness must swear an oath or affirm that he will testify truthfully, 
 
Amendment is a guarantee against testimonial compulsion of self-incrimination).  
Indeed, Wigmore condemned such exemptions as “so many derogations from a 
positive general rule,” and as “obstacle[s] to the administration of justice.”  4 WIGMORE, 
supra note 95, § 2192, at 649, 651. 
 113  Blair, 250 U.S. at 281; see also New York v. O’Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 11 (1959) (“A 
citizen cannot shirk his duty, no matter how inconvenienced thereby, to testify in 
criminal proceedings and grand jury investigations in a State where he is found.”); 
Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 438 (“It is also beyond controversy that one of the duties which 
the citizen owes to his government is to support the administration of justice by 
attending its courts and giving his testimony whenever he is properly summoned[,] . . . 
[a]nd the Congress may provide for the performance of this duty and prescribe 
penalties for disobedience.”) (internal citation omitted).   
 114  United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974) (quoting Blair, 250 U.S. at 
282).  
 115  See 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 1621, 1623 (LexisNexis 2014); Blair, 250 U.S. at 282 (“[T]he 
witness is bound . . . to tell what he knows in answer to questions framed for the 
purpose of bringing out the truth of the matter under inquiry.”). 
 116  Calandra, 414 U.S. at 345 (quoting Blair, 250 U.S. at 281).  
 117  See 18 U.S.C.S. § 1512(b). 
 118  Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 438 (“And the Congress may provide for the performance 
of this duty and prescribe penalties for disobedience.”).   
 119  See 18 U.S.C.S. § 401; 28 U.S.C.S. § 1826(a) (LexisNexis 2014) (“Whenever a 
witness . . . refuses without just cause shown to comply with an order of the court to 
testify . . . the court . . . may summarily order his confinement . . . .”).   
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in a “form designed to impress that duty on the witness’s conscience.”120  
Failure to tell the truth is not only a punishable offense,121 but the 
Supreme Court has held that in the judicial process of obtaining a 
witness’s testimony, perjury “simply has no place whatever.”122 
Courts have routinely relied on the witness’s independent duty to 
testify to reject attempts by citizens, regardless of their role in society, 
to circumvent their obligation to comply with the judicial process.  For 
example, in United States v. Nixon, the Court required President Nixon 
to comply with a subpoena reasoning that “[t]he very integrity of the 
judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full 
disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of 
evidence.”123  A court’s authority to compel testimony is “imperative to 
the function of courts” and to “ensure that justice be done.”124  At the 
same time, citizens who have failed to comply with the court’s orders 
(or who lie while testifying) have met stringent punishments.125 
Lastly, in an effort to keep judicial testimony free from outside 
pressures, the Supreme Court recognized the common law civil 
damage immunity afforded to witnesses.  In Briscoe v. LaHue, the Court 
held that a police officer was immune from civil liability suits under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 based on his allegedly perjurious testimony at a criminal 
trial.126  The plaintiff, previously convicted of burglarizing a house 
trailer, claimed that the defendant lied during trial by testifying that 
plaintiff was one out of 50 to 100 people “whose prints would match a 
partial thumbprint” found at the crime scene.127  The plaintiff insisted 
that the testimony was false because the FBI and state police had 
deemed the partial thumbprint evidence unreliable.128 
 
 
 120  FED. R. EVID. 603 (2011).  
 121  18 U.S.C.S. § 1621 (“Whoever having taken an oath before a competent 
tribunal . . . that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, . . . [states] willfully 
and contrary to such oath. . . any material matter which he does not believe to be 
true . . . is guilty of perjury and shall . . . be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than five 
years, or both.”). 
 122  United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976).  
 123  United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).  
 124  Id.; see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686 (1972) (holding that the 
general obligation of every citizen to testify outweighs the newsman’s privilege).  
 125  See United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 319 (1975) (affirming criminal 
contempt conviction of a citizen who refused to testify); Blackmer v. United States, 284 
U.S. 421, 438 (1932) (same); United States v. Burge, 711 F.3d 803, 815 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(affirming a four-and-a-half-year conviction for perjury and obstruction of justice of 
former Chicago police commander). 
 126  Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330–31 (1983). 
 127  Id. at 326–27.  
 128  Id. at 327.  
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The Court found that Congress intended this section of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871 to include the same protections afforded to 
witnesses at common law for civil damage claims.129  The Court 
reasoned that “the claims of the individual must yield to the dictates of 
public policy, which requires that the paths which lead to the 
ascertainment of truth should be left as free and unobstructed as 
possible.”130  Specifically, the Briscoe Court found that when citizens are 
called to be witnesses, they have a non-negotiable duty to testify, 
making their protection from civil liability essential.131 
In sum, the testimonial process is a bedrock principle of our 
judicial system.  The Supreme Court has continually recognized it as 
such, whether by adopting the common law axiom that society is 
entitled to every man’s testimony, or by maintaining the testimonial 
process as free from outside pressures as possible.  Thus, it came as no 
surprise that the Court recognized truthful testimony as a 
“quintessential example of speech as a citizen” when deciding the next 
public employee speech case, Lane v. Franks, in June 2014.132 
IV. LANE V. FRANKS: PURSUANT TO “ORDINARY” JOB DUTIES STANDARD 
While conducting a financial audit, Edward Lane, a program 
director at a community college, discovered that Suzanne Schmitz, a 
state representative employed by the college, was committing fraud 
and fired her.133  This spawned an investigation by the FBI leading to a 
grand jury proceeding and later a trial, where Lane testified about his 
reasons for terminating Schmitz.134  Subsequently, Steve Franks, 
president of the college, fired twenty-nine employees, including Lane, 
but later rescinded all terminations except Lane’s and that of another 
employee.135  Lane sued claiming that Frank had fired him, in violation 
of the First Amendment, due to his testimony against Schmitz.136 
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, 
finding Lane’s testimony unprotected under Garcetti because he “had 
learned of the information that he testified about while working as 
Director . . . such that his speech [could] still be considered as part of 
his official job duties and not made as a citizen on a matter of public 
 
 129  Id. at 334. 
 130  Id. at 332–33 (quoting Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193, 197 (Wis. 1860)).  
 131  Id. at 333. 
 132  Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (2014).  
 133  Id. at 2375. 
 134  Id.  
 135  Id. at 2376.  
 136  Id. 
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concern.”137  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Lane spoke 
as an employee and not a citizen because he acted “pursuant to his 
official duties when he investigated Schmitz[‘s] employment, spoke 
with Schmitz and [college] officials regarding the issue, and 
terminated Schmitz.”138  Since his testimony owed its existence to his 
professional responsibilities, under Garcetti, it constituted the product 
commissioned by his employer.  Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit found 
that Lane spoke as an employee and not as a citizen when he took the 
stand.139  Additionally, the court held that in any event, the defendant 
was entitled to qualified immunity.140 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari “to resolve discord among 
the Court of Appeals as to whether public employees may be fired—or 
suffer other adverse employment consequences—for providing 
truthful subpoenaed testimony outside the course of their ordinary job 
responsibilities.”141  In a unanimous opinion by Justice Sotomayor, the 
Court reversed in part and remanded, holding that Lane’s testimony 
constituted protected citizen speech but agreeing with the Eleventh 
Circuit that the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity.142  The 
Court observed that Garcetti “said nothing about speech that simply 
relates to public employment or concerns information learned in the 
course of public employment.”143  As such, the Eleventh Circuit read 
Garcetti far too broadly by treating as dispositive the fact that “Lane 
learned of the subject matter of his testimony in the course of his 
employment.”144  Rather, the proper inquiry was “whether the speech 
at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties.”145 
In finding Lane’s speech to be citizen speech, the Court 
emphasized the fact that the speech at issue was sworn testimony in 
judicial proceedings.146  The Court observed that the Eleventh Circuit 
had given “short shrift to the nature of sworn judicial statements and 
 
 137  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 138  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377.  
 139  Id. at 2376–77. 
 140  Id. at 2377.  
 141  Id.   
 142  Id. at 2383. 
 143  Id. at 2379.  
 144  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379.  
 145  Id. (emphasis added).  It was undisputed that Lane’s ordinary job duties did not 
include testifying, thus the Court chose not to directly address whether truthful 
testimony made pursuant to ordinary job duties would constitute citizen speech.  See 
id. at 2378 n.4.  As explained in Part V, infra, however, the Court’s analysis and 
language provide the foundation for answering that question in the affirmative.   
 146  Id. at 2378–79. 
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ignored the obligation borne by all witnesses to testify under oath.”147  
Particularly, the Court noted that “[s]worn testimony in judicial 
proceedings is a quintessential example of speech as a citizen for a 
simple reason: Anyone who testifies in court bears an obligation, to the 
court and society at large, to tell the truth.”148  Thus, a public employee 
who testifies in judicial proceedings has an independent duty to testify 
truthfully that exists separate and apart from any other duty he may 
owe to his employer.  The Court found that this “independent 
obligation renders sworn testimony speech as a citizen and sets it apart 
from speech made purely in the capacity of an employee.”149 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia and Justice Alito, 
concurred by stating that answering Lane’s question “require[d] little 
more than a straightforward application of Garcetti.”150  Justice Thomas 
further opined that the question whether a public employee speaks as 
a citizen on a matter of public concern when the employee gives 
truthful testimony under oath in the course of his ordinary job 
responsibilities, was a “quite different question” left for another day.151 
V. LANE AS THE FOUNDATION FOR COMPLETELY PROTECTING PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEE SWORN TESTIMONY 
Although Lane does not expressly discuss whether the First 
Amendment protects sworn testimony made pursuant to ordinary job 
duties, the decision lays the foundation for protecting such speech by 
narrowing and refining Garcetti’s “pursuant to official duties” standard, 
as well as by holding that truthful testimony is inherently citizen 
speech. 
A. Lane Reins in the Scope of Garcetti 
Key language in Lane reins in the scope of Garcetti so that only on 
rare occasions will truthful testimony fall within the ordinary job duties 
of public employees.152  In Garcetti, the Court did not provide a 
 
 147  Id.  
 148  Id. at 2379.  
 149  Id. (emphasis added). 
 150  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2383 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 151  Id. 
 152  In the months since the Court’s decision, several lower courts have interpreted 
Lane as narrowing Garcetti’s reach.  See, e.g., Mpoy v. Rhee, 758 F.3d 285, 295 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (“[T]he use of the adjective ‘ordinary’—which the court repeated nine times—
could signal a narrowing of the realm of employee speech left unprotected by 
Garcetti.”); Hagan v. City of New York, 39 F. Supp. 3d 481, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (stating 
that Lane can be understood as narrowing Garcetti, and that “the focus is on [the 
employee’s] ‘ordinary’ job responsibilities”); Holt v. Commonwealth, No. 10-5510, 
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framework for defining the scope of an employee’s duties.  But the 
majority stated that job descriptions are “neither necessary nor 
sufficient to demonstrate that conducting the task is within the scope 
of the employee’s professional duties for First Amendment 
purposes.”153  Instead, the Court emphasized the need for a practical 
inquiry.154 
The Lane Court again emphasized the need for a practical inquiry.  
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion, however, does more than pay lip service 
to Garcetti; Lane refines and narrows Garcetti’s “pursuant to official 
duties” standard in two ways.  First, the Court’s use of the term 
“ordinary” to qualify “official duties,” which does not appear in 
Garcetti’s majority opinion, both sharpens the inquiry and narrows the 
realm of employee speech left unprotected by Garcetti.  Under Lane, 
the question is not whether an employee speaks pursuant to any official 
duty, but whether the speech is made pursuant to one of the ordinary 
official duties.  Thus, Lane mandates that the speech act itself 
constitute part of the public employee’s routine or “ordinary” job 
duties. 
Second, Lane provides guidance as to what constitutes speech 
made pursuant to official duties.  An employee does not speak pursuant 
to official duties simply because the speech “concerns information 
related to or learned through public employment.”155  This language 
also narrows the reach of Garcetti.  An employee does not speak 
pursuant to his ordinary duties simply because the content of his 
speech relates to, or is something learned while conducting, official 
job duties.  Thus, the fact that Lane learned about Schmitz’s fraud 
while conducting one of his ordinary duties (a financial audit) as the 
school’s program director, or that his testimony related to this duty, 
does not mean Lane testified “pursuant to” his official duties.  Clearly, 
Lane’s ordinary official duties did not include providing sworn 
testimony about fraud under subpoena.  Instead, an employee speaks 
pursuant to job duties only when the conduct is part of what the 
employee was ordinarily employed and paid to do. 
These refinements severely limit the possibility of courts reaching 
decisions such as those in Huppert and Green.  For example, Huppert 
was a gang investigator within the Pittsburg Police Department when 
the court subpoenaed him to testify before a civil grand jury in charge 
 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113409, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2014) (stating that Lane 
brought the Supreme Court precedent in line with the Third Circuit Reilly decision).  
 153  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006).   
 154  Id. at 424. 
 155  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377. 
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of investigating corruption in the PPD.156  Huppert claimed that his 
supervisor retaliated against him for his testimony.157  Applying Garcetti, 
the court held that Huppert had spoken as an employee because 
testifying was part of his official duties as a police officer.158 
Under Lane, however, the result is much different.  Even assuming 
that Huppert’s official job duties as a gang investigator included 
testifying in court, the courts must apply Lane’s refinements.  That is, 
was testifying in court and civil grand juries one of Huppert’s ordinary 
duties?  And was his testimony made “pursuant to” that ordinary duty, 
or did his testimony merely concern information related to or learned 
through his employment? 
As a gang investigator, Huppert’s ordinary duties would have 
likely included monitoring gang members, investigating gang-related 
crimes, apprehending perpetrators and confiscating the fruits of their 
crimes, writing reports related to these activities, and perhaps testifying 
in court about said arrests.159  Thus, for example, assume that after 
conducting an extensive investigation of a suspected gang member, 
Huppert discovers a drug ring and apprehends the perpetrators in the 
act.  Huppert’s testimony in court addressing the methods he used, 
and how and why he arrested the defendant gang members, would 
arguably be speech made pursuant to his ordinary job duties.160 
Applying Lane’s framework to the facts in Huppert, however, leads 
to a different conclusion.  Unlike Huppert’s hypothetical testimony 
regarding the gang-related crimes, Huppert’s testimony before the 
grand jury relating to possible corruption within the PPD falls under 
speech that “concerns information related to or learned through 
public employment.”  That testimony is in no way “pursuant to” his job 
duties or part of his “ordinary” job duties as a gang investigator.  Unlike 
Garcetti, where Ceballos’s job ordinarily required him to prepare 
internal memorandums, Huppert’s job did not ordinarily require him 
to testify about possible corruption within the police department 
 
 156  Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 157  Id. 
 158  Id. at 707. 
 159  See, e.g., Gang Investigations Unit, SAN JOSE POLICE DEP’T, 
http://www.sjpd.org/BOI/Gang_Investigations.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2014); Police 
Gang Unit Careers and Job Description, LAWENFORCEMENTEDU.NET, 
http://www.lawenforcementedu.net/police-officer/police-gang-unit/ (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2014).  I rely here on a simple job description merely to illustrate a point.  
Under Lane and Garcetti, the job description is not dispositive, and courts must conduct 
a fact intensive “practical inquiry” in order to reveal an employee’s true ordinary 
official duties.  
 160  As will be explained in Part V.B, infra, this speech should still be protected given 
the countervailing interests. 
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before a civil grand jury; the PPD did not employ or pay Huppert to 
do that.  Like Lane’s testimony, Huppert’s testimony owed its existence 
to his willingness to perform his civic duty as a citizen.  It is, therefore, 
clearly protected citizen speech. 
Similarly, in Green, Chief Jailer Green testified at an emergency 
hearing in Fulton County Superior Court to determine whether the 
jail was sufficiently safe to keep a convicted murderer who had recently 
attempted to escape.161  Green testified that the cell doors had 
problems and were not secure, and the next day the Sheriff fired her.162  
Relying on Garcetti’s broad language, the Eleventh Circuit held that 
because Green’s testimony arose from her position as Chief Jailer, she 
spoke pursuant to her official duties, and therefore, her speech was 
unprotected by the First Amendment.163 
Undoubtedly, Green’s testimony related to her job as Chief Jailer.  
Applying Lane’s refined test, however, the fact that her speech relates 
to her job or contained information learned on the job is not 
dispositive.164  Green’s ordinary job duties were to maintain the jail, not 
to testify or appear in hearings about the jail, meaning that her 
testimony about the cell doors fell outside her ordinary job duties.  
Similarly, Green did not testify pursuant to her ordinary duties, but 
rather, her testimony “concern[ed] information related to or learned 
through [her] public employment.”165  Thus, Lane undercuts the reach 
of Garcetti and reinvigorates First Amendment protections for public 
employees. 
B. Truthful Testimony Made Pursuant to Ordinary Job Duties Should be 
Protected as a “Quintessential Example of Speech as a Citizen”166 
Even with Lane’s refinement and narrowing of Garcetti, there may 
be thousands of public employees for whom testifying will constitute 
speech made pursuant to an ordinary job duty.  In 2014, the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics estimated that federal, state, and local agencies 
employed over 844,000 detectives, investigators, and police officers.167  
For most, if not all, of these public employees, testifying is often one of 
 
 161  Green v. Barrett, 226 F. App’x 883, 884 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 
 162  Id.   
 163  Id. at 886.   
 164  See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2377 (2014). 
 165  Id.  
 166  Id. at 2379.  
 167  See Household Data Annual Averages, supra note 4, at 6 (indicating that in 2014 
these agencies employed 164,000 detectives and criminal investigators, and 680,000 
police and sheriff’s patrol officers).  
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their official duties.168  Yet, sworn testimony is clearly citizen speech—
speech grounded in independent civic duties that can have a 
substantial impact on how a jury or judge decides matters affecting a 
person’s life, liberty, and property.  Justice Sotomayor’s opinion in 
Lane expressly recognized it as such by declaring that sworn testimony 
is “a quintessential example of speech as a citizen.”169  Thus, while the 
Court did not expressly reach this question, Justice Sotomayor’s 
language lays the foundation for a future Court to find sworn 
testimony made pursuant to ordinary job duties to always be protected 
citizen speech. 
A closer look at Garcetti reveals the likelihood of this result.  Justice 
Kennedy and the majority in Garcetti rested the Court’s opinion as to 
why speech made pursuant to official duties is always unprotected 
employee speech on three main rationales.  First, the majority 
reasoned that restrictions on speech made pursuant to public 
employee job duties “do[] not infringe any liberties the employee 
might have enjoyed as a private citizen.”170  Second, this restriction in 
no way undermines “the potential societal value of employee speech,” 
since employees “retain the prospect of constitutional protection for 
their contributions to the civic discourse.”171  Finally, the majority 
reasoned that granting First Amendment protection to public 
employee speech made pursuant to ordinary job duties would  
“commit state and federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive 
role, mandating oversight of communications between and among 
government employees and their superiors in the course of official 
business,” and would “displace[] . . . managerial discretion.”172  Thus, 
for the majority, when an employee speaks pursuant to official duties, 
that speech is never afforded protection under the First Amendment. 
As the dissenting Justices warned, however, “[‘never’], in [their] 
view, is too absolute.”173  Particularly, Justice Souter’s dissent, joined by 
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, specifically cautioned that “the claim 
 
 168  See, e.g., Police and Detectives, supra note 4 (noting that uniformed police officers, 
detectives, and investigators typically testify in court as part of their duties).  As 
illustrated by the hypothetical Huppert scenario, see supra text accompanying note 160, 
testimony from law enforcement employees regarding the methods, reasons, and how 
a particular investigation occurred will likely meet the Garcetti test, even under Lane’s 
refinements.  
 169  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379.  
 170  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006).  
 171  Id.  
 172  Id. at 423. 
 173  Id. at 446 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The 
proper answer to the question . . . is ‘Sometimes,’ not ‘Never.’”).   
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relating to truthful testimony in court must surely be analyzed 
independently to protect the integrity of the judicial process.”174  And 
for good reason, as the Seventh Circuit laid out, the Garcetti rationales 
lose traction when the speech in question implicates the citizen duty 
and right to testify truthfully.175 
1. Not Protecting Sworn Testimony Made Pursuant to 
Ordinary Job Duties Infringes a Citizen’s Duty and 
Right to Testify 
In Garcetti, the majority reasoned that restrictions on speech made 
pursuant to public a employee’s job duties “do[] not infringe any 
liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.”176  After 
all, Ceballos prepared the speech in question (an internal 
memorandum) because it was part of his daily duties as a calendar 
deputy—what he was paid to do.  No citizen would prepare such a 
memorandum, meaning that even though a public employee does not 
cease to be a citizen simply because his employment, Ceballos did not 
lose a liberty he otherwise enjoyed as a citizen when his employer 
disciplined him for preparing the memo. 
Truthful testimony, however, involves far greater countervailing 
interests.  First, unlike the internal memo at issue in Garcetti, testimony 
in a judicial proceeding owes its existence to the right and civic duty of 
every citizen to aid law enforcement, not to a job duty imposed by an 
employer.  By adopting the common law principle that the public has 
a right to “every man’s evidence,” the Framers, Congress, and the 
Court infused every citizen with the ordinary duty and the right to 
testify.177  As Justice Gray announced in 1895, “[i]t is the duty and the 
right . . . of every citizen[] to assist in prosecuting, and in securing the 
punishment of, any breach of the peace of the United States.”178  When 
a public employee testifies, he does so because that is his civic duty and 
right, not because it is his job.  Thus, a public employer who threatens 
retaliation against an employee who wants to exercise his right and 
duty as a citizen to testify in court violates a liberty that the employee 
enjoyed as a private citizen—the duty and right to participate in the 
judicial process, and thus, the democratic process. 
 
 174  Id. at 444 (Souter, J., dissenting).   
 175  See Chrzanowski v. Bianchi, 725 F.3d 734, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 2870 (2014).  
 176  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422. 
 177  See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 175 n.24 (1977) (“The 
conviction that private citizens have a duty to provide assistance to law enforcement 
officials when it is required is by no means foreign to our traditions . . . .”).  
 178  In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 535 (1895).  
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Second, when the court subpoenas a citizen, this ordinary duty 
becomes an enforceable legal obligation “which every person within 
the jurisdiction of the Government is bound to perform.”179  And in the 
role of a witness, a person is not entitled to object and cannot interfere 
with or set limits to the court’s authority.180  Thus, when a public 
employee has been subpoenaed, the law requires him to come before 
the court and testify, or face fines and even imprisonment.181  A public 
employer threatening retaliation for the employee’s appearance in a 
judicial proceeding places the employee in an “impossible position, 
torn between” complying with a court order and facing retaliation 
from the employer, or violating the subpoena and facing legal 
penalties.182  Thus, unlike retaliation for work product like an internal 
memo, the prospect of facing these penalties infringes the employee’s 
right as a citizen to his property and his liberty. 
Finally, regardless of whether the court subpoenas the public 
employee or he voluntarily complies with the citizen’s duty to testify, 
he is bound by the legal duty to always testify truthfully.  In serving as 
a witness, a person “has the solemn and fundamental duty to tell the 
truth”183 and must swear or affirm to do so before being permitted to 
testify.184  Indeed, Lane recognized that “[a]nyone who testifies in court 
bears an obligation, to the court and society at large, to tell the 
truth.”185  Additionally, failure to comply can result in substantial 
penalties, including incarceration.186  This means that a public 
 
 179  Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 283 (1919); see also New York v. O’Neill, 359 
U.S. 1, 11 (1959); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932). 
 180  See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974) (quoting Blair, 250 U.S. 
at 281–82). 
 181  See 18 U.S.C.S. § 401 (LexisNexis 2014).  See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, 8-Month Jail 
Term Ends as Maker of Video Turns Over a Copy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007, at A9 (freelance 
journalist held for 224 days for “refusing to turn over a videotape” of demonstration); 
Kim Murphy, Two Freed in Anarchist Case, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2013, at A8 (“Two 
activists . . . held for more than five months, mostly in solitary confinement[,] to 
pressure them to testify about suspected anarchists.”). 
 182  See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014).   
 183  Golden Door Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters Non-Marine Ass’n, 
865 F. Supp. 1516, 1526 (S.D. Fla. 1994), aff’d in part, 117 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 1997); 
see also Blair, 250 U.S. at 282.  
 184  FED. R. EVID. 603.  
 185  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379 (citing 18 U.S.C.S. § 1623); see also United States v. 
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“Perjured testimony is an 
obvious and flagrant affront to the basic concept of judicial proceedings.”).  
 186  See 18 U.S.C.S. § 1621 (“Whoever having taken an oath before a competent 
tribunal . . . that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly . . . [states] willfully and 
contrary to such oath . . . any material matter which he does not believe to be true . . . 
is guilty of perjury and shall . . . be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than five years, 
or both.”); Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 576 (“In this constitutional process of securing a 
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employee who testifies, whether pursuant to ordinary job duties or not, 
is bound by law to do so truthfully.  This too, places the employee in a 
no-win position, torn between telling the truth and facing the 
employer’s wrath, or lying and facing the high burdens of perjury.  
Again, the prospect of facing these penalties infringes the employee’s 
liberty as a citizen to be free from government sanctions. 
Therefore, the application of Garcetti to truthful testimony made 
pursuant to ordinary job duties places the public employee in a 
precarious lose-lose situation.  The employee will be forced to choose 
between telling the truth and losing his job, or not complying with the 
court orders and/or lying and facing substantial legal penalties.  This 
dilemma violates not only the public employee’s right as a citizen to 
property and liberty, but also his right to contribute to the public 
discourse in judicial proceedings.  As Justice Sotomayor stated in Lane, 
the presence of the independent obligation and right to testify, and to 
testify truthfully, not only changes Garcetti’s calculus, but also “renders 
sworn testimony speech as a citizen and sets it apart from speech made 
purely in the capacity of an employee.”187 
2. Application of Garcetti in This Context Undermines the 
Societal Value of Truthful Testimony 
The majority in Garcetti further reasoned that refusing to 
recognize First Amendment protection for a public employee’s work 
product—speech made pursuant to official duties—in no way 
undermines “the potential societal value of employee speech,” since 
public employees “retain the prospect of constitutional protection for 
their contributions to the civic discourse.”188  In other words, the fact 
that Ceballos’s job required him to write memoranda did not stop him 
from joining a political party or speaking his mind about a political 
issue.  He could still contribute to society. 
This rationale, however, does not follow when the speech in 
question is truthful testimony.  As discussed supra, testimony in judicial 
proceedings owes its existence to the right and civic duty of every citizen 
to aid law enforcement, not merely an employee’s job duty.  Unlike the 
internal memo at issue in Garcetti, testimony is not a work product, 
something an employer commissions and pays an employee to do.  
Rather, testimony in judicial proceedings arises from the common law 
principle that “the public has a right to every man’s evidence.”189 
 
witness’ testimony, perjury simply has no place whatever.”).  
 187  See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379 (emphasis added).   
 188  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006).  
 189  Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972) (citing 12 T.C. HANSARD, THE 
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Moreover, Lane recognized that sworn testimony—the bedrock of 
our judicial system—has an immeasurable societal value.190  The 
Framers understood the need to secure “every man’s evidence” by 
adding the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.191  And Congress 
implemented the principle through statutes creating the extraordinary 
power to fine and jail those that refuse to cooperate with court orders 
or defy their obligation to testify truthfully.192  Indeed, truthful 
testimony is “so necessary to the administration of justice” that the 
witness’s personal interest in privacy must yield to the public’s 
overriding interest in full disclosure.193  It is because of this substantial 
value to society that the Briscoe Court recognized, as the common law 
courts did, that truthful testimony must be free from outside 
pressures.194  By adopting the civil liability immunity given to witnesses 
at common law, the Briscoe Court highlighted that such external 
pressures cause witnesses to self-censor, to the detriment of the judicial 
process. 
Not extending First Amendment protection to truthful testimony 
made pursuant to ordinary job duties undoubtedly chills the public 
employee’s valuable “contributions to the civic discourse” in one of the 
most important forums, the courtroom.  Given that witnesses have a 
non-negotiable duty to testify truthfully,195 without First Amendment 
protections for truthful testimony made pursuant to ordinary job 
duties, public employees will be placed in “an impossible position, torn 
between the obligation to testify truthfully and the desire to avoid 
retaliation and keep their jobs”196 causing a chilling effect on speech.  
 
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 675, 693 (1812)); see also 4 WIGMORE, supra note 
95 § 2192, at 651 (“From the point of view of society’s right to our testimony, it is to be 
remembered that the demand comes, not from any one person or set of persons, but 
from the community as a whole—from justice as an institution, and from law and order 
as indispensable elements of civilized life.”) (emphasis added). 
 190  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379 (“Sworn testimony in judicial proceedings is a 
quintessential example of speech as a citizen for a simple reason: Anyone who testifies 
in court bears an obligation, to the court and society at large, to tell the truth.”) (emphasis 
added).  
 191  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . .”). 
 192  See 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 401, 1621 (LexisNexis 2014). 
 193  United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974).  See also 4 WIGMORE, supra 
note 95 § 2192, at 651 (noting that the testimonial process is “a pulse of air in the 
breathing organs of the community”).  
 194  Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 337 (1983) (quoting Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 
193, 197 (1860)). 
 195  See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 333.  
 196  Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014). 
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First, subpoenaed employees will self-censor their testimony as they 
walk the thin line between complying with the court’s orders and not 
angering their employers.  Second, employees who would otherwise 
want to voluntarily testify will choose not to do so if an employer 
threatens retaliation, since they know that once they are in court they 
will have a legal obligation to tell the truth. 
This chilling effect is particularly troublesome given that, as the 
Court noted in Pickering and its progeny, public employees are “the 
members of the community most likely to have informed and definite 
opinions” on the subject.197  Police officers, detectives, and other 
similarly situated public employees are the members of our society 
most likely to have informed opinions as to what the facts of a 
particular investigation are, or whether a particular suspect truly is 
guilty or not.  If a public employer acts to protect a suspect, say similar 
to what Bianchi did in Chrzanowski,198 that obviously chills the well-
informed opinion of the officer who conducted the investigation and 
discovered the criminality of Bianchi’s family members.  This is 
precisely the type of adverse influence that courts at common law and 
the Court in Briscoe tried to avoid by providing civil damage immunity 
for truthful testimony.  The great constitutional and public interest to 
“every man’s evidence” requires “that the paths which lead to the 
ascertainment of truth should be left as free and unobstructed as 
possible.”199  Not protecting the sworn testimony of a public employee 
undoubtedly places substantial obstructions in this path. 
Further, a government employer will rarely have a compelling 
managerial interest in censoring a public employee from testifying.  
On the other hand, the constitutional rights of due process of law place 
an overwhelming social value on this speech.  This is because unlike 
an internal memorandum made pursuant to ordinary duties, a 
witness’s truthful testimony can decide the outcome of a case: it can 
mean the difference between awarding damages in a simple tort case, 
or an individual losing his rights to life, liberty, or property in a 
 
 197  Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968).  
 198  Chrzanowski v. Bianchi, 725 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
2870 (2014). 
 199  Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 337.  By adopting this common law principle, the Briscoe 
Court understood that such outside pressures on the testimonial process would serve 
only to undermine the “vital process of justice” which “must continue unceasingly; a 
single cessation typifies the prostration of society; a series would involve its 
dissolution.”  4 WIGMORE, supra note 95, § 2192, at 651; see also id. § 2195, at 659 
(arguing that the duty to testify is temporarily paramount and witnesses “should be 
encouraged, by the removal of all obstacles, to fulfill it freely and promptly”).  
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criminal case.200  It is in this respect, that sworn testimony is essential to 
our self-governance.201 
Perhaps in some rare circumstance, such as in the realm of 
national security, the government in its role as an employer may 
articulate an important government interest requiring utmost 
confidentiality.  And under such circumstances, the government 
employer may truly possess a strong managerial discretionary interest 
in curtailing the public employee’s speech.  But as shown by the Court 
in Nixon, such national security interests must be balanced against the 
interests of the public in due process of law and justice.  The Court can 
provide a bright-line exception when such high stakes are present.  By 
and large, however, application of the Garcetti rule to a public 
employee’s truthful testimony completely denies speech in the name 
of a disputable managerial interest.  As such, contrary to Garcetti’s 
reasoning, it chills the public employee’s ability to contribute to the 
public discourse and, as a result, undermines the significant societal 
value contained in the testimonial process.  Therefore, public 
employees testifying pursuant to ordinary duties must speak as citizens. 
3. The Courts Already Control the Testimonial Process 
Finally, the majority in Garcetti reasoned that extending First 
Amendment protection to public employee speech made pursuant to 
official duties would commit the courts “to a new, permanent, and 
intrusive role,” of constant “oversight of communications between and 
among government employees and their superiors in the course of 
official business.”202  This, the majority found, would be “inconsistent 
with sound principles of federalism and the separation of powers.”203  
In effect, the Court favored a bright-line rule fearing that a case-by-case 
Pickering-Connick balancing approach in such situations would create 
unnecessary entanglement. 
But this rationale is inapposite in the context of truthful 
testimony.  Unlike an internal memorandum written pursuant to daily 
employment responsibilities, truthful testimony made pursuant to 
ordinary job duties has a very “relevant analogue to speech by citizens 
 
 200 See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964), abrogated by 
United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 688 (1998) (noting the importance of testimony 
in the discovery of “certain crimes for which evidence would not otherwise be 
available”). 
 201  See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 93–94.  See also 4 WIGMORE, supra note 95, § 2192, at 651 
(“The whole life of the community, the regularity and continuity of its relations, 
depend upon the coming of the witness.”).  
 202  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006). 
 203  Id.  
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who are not government employees.”204  Regardless of whether a public 
employee testifies pursuant to an ordinary job duty or not, it is within 
the sole discretion of the courts, not the government employer, when 
and how a witness may testify in a judicial proceeding.205 
For instance, the courts, through the statutory power of 
subpoena, have the sole authority to compel citizens to appear in a 
judicial proceeding and may enforce this compulsory process through 
the power of contempt.206  Once a citizen is in court, the courts control 
what the witness may say through mechanisms such as the Federal 
Rules of Evidence and the duty to testify truthfully.207  Additionally, it is 
also axiomatic that no one, not even the government in its capacity as 
an employer, can force a witness to not testify or to lie during 
testimony.208 
Thus, it is clear that testimony in judicial proceedings is not 
determined by a government employer’s managerial discretion.  Only 
the courts can compel citizens to testify, provide the procedures for 
allowing what witnesses may or may not say, and discipline witnesses 
for not complying with its rules.  Coupled with the fact that the 
government employer cannot influence or tell its employee what to say 
in court, it is evident that protecting truthful testimony would not 
“commit state and federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive 
role,”209 as Garcetti posited.  To the contrary, to permit a government 
employer to dictate when, how, and to what a public employee may 
testify would intrude upon the judicial branch’s authority.  As such, by 
carving a new bright-line rule out of Garcetti that protects testimony 
made pursuant to ordinary job duties, the Court will not be creating 
entanglement, but rather, will be eliminating it.  Therefore, a 
government employer’s “managerial discretion” can never pierce a 
court’s authority to control the testimonial process and as a result, 
when a public employee provides sworn testimony, he speaks as a 
citizen, not a public employee. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Justice Sotomayor’s Lane opinion paves the way for finding that 
when a public employee provides truthful testimony pursuant to 
ordinary job duties, he speaks as a citizen, not an employee.  Lane 
narrows Garcetti’s reach by adding the qualifier “ordinary” and by 
providing guidance as to what constitutes speech made “pursuant to” 
those ordinary duties.  Under these refinements, only on rare 
occasions will a public employee provide truthful testimony pursuant 
to ordinary job duties, limiting the lower court’s ability to reach 
decisions such as Huppert and Green. 
Additionally, even on those occasions where public employees 
testify pursuant to ordinary job duties, such as the thousands of police 
officers, detectives, and investigators that take the stand every year, the 
courts must extend First Amendment protections.  Lane’s recognition 
of the independent citizen duty to testify provides the foundation 
needed for a future Supreme Court to find this speech protected, 
particularly because the Garcetti rationales do not apply in this context.  
Application of Garcetti violates a public employee’s rights and liberties 
as a citizen given that sworn testimony made pursuant to ordinary job 
duties has a very “relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not 
government employees”210—the right and duty to provide truthful 
testimony.  The duty to provide truthful testimony is essential to our 
judicial system and not extending First Amendment protection to it 
will undoubtedly undermine its fundamental societal value by causing 
public employees, the members of society who are most likely to be 
well informed in the subject, to self-censor.  Finally, it cannot be said 
that extending First Amendment protections to public employees in 
this context will commit the courts to a new intrusive role—the courts 
already hold the sole authority over witnesses and their testimony.  To 
the contrary, allowing government employers to dictate the testimonial 
process will undermine the judiciary’s authority and thus, will violate 
“sound principles of federalism and separation of powers.”211  By 
carving a bright-line rule out of Garcetti that protects testimony made 
pursuant to ordinary job duties, the Court will not open the door to 
entanglement, but rather, will be eliminating it. 
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